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Commentary
Lawrence Berger*
Solving the Problem of Abusive
Mortgage Foreclosure Sales
It is an old well-worn scenario: R is the owner of a house worth
$60,000, and is personally liable on a $40,000 mortgage on the property
to the E Co. R is in financial trouble and defaults on the loan. E Co.
begins foreclosure and in a judicial sale of the house, E Co. is the only
bidder and buys in for $31,000. E Co. does not have to put up that
amount in cash but merely credits the $31,000 bid price against the
balance due on the loan; now R owes $9,000 plus any interest that has
accrued. E Co. gets a "deficiency judgment" against R for that
amount, and proceeds to garnish his wages until the balance plus any
additional accrued interest is finally collected. In the meantime as
soon as the foreclosure sale is confirmed, E Co. puts the house on the
market and in a quick sale disposes of it for a net of $55,000 after com-
missions and other expenses. As a result, in addition to the normal
interest charges, E Co. has recovered the principal amount of $64,0001
on a $40,000 loan. At the same time, R has been deprived of the
$20,000 equity in his home, and in addition has had to pay E Co. a
$9,000 deficiency judgment. Thus, in effect R has given $69,000 to pay
off a $40,000 loan, in addition to the normal interest charges.2
R has two major complaints in this situation. First, to enforce the
loan, E Co. is taking property whose value is in excess of the amount
owed to it. Second, to add insult to injury, E Co. is claiming R owes
still more, in the face of the fact that it has already been made more
than whole. Both of these problems stem from one flaw in the present
system; viz., that a mortgagee can, through the device of a foreclosure
sale, acquire the secured property for its own account at a fictitiously
low figure, and then use that unfairly small amount as the appropriate
dollar credit against the amount due on the loan.
* Robert J. Kutak Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College
of Law.
1. This consists of the $55,000 net proceeds on the house and the $9,000 deficiency
judgment.
2. This consists of the $60,000 fair market value of the house that R is losing, plus
the $9,000 deficiency judgment.
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One could ask just how prevalent this double-bind situation is.
There is not extensive empirical data on the subject of just what hap-
pens in the typical foreclosure in the United States, but there are sev-
eral studies3 that seem to verify much of the mostly anecdotal
material that every professional in the law of mortgages has heard.
The most useful for our purposes appears in a recent article by Profes-
sor Wechsler.4 Wechsler made an empirical study of the 118 mortgage
foreclosures that were commenced during 1979 in Onondaga County,
New York. He studied court files which revealed the terms of the
original loan, land description, amount due as of the time of foreclo-
sure sale, identity of the successful bidder, amount bid, whether the
mortgagee sought a deficiency judgment, and other relevant data. In
addition he examined the subsequent history of the foreclosed prop-
erty to see whether it was resold in a normal competitive market and
for how much.
The study disclosed some very interesting and, in some cases, sur-
prising data. First of all, mortgagees bought in at only 77% of the fore-
closure sales. The balance of the purchases were made by unrelated
third parties. The conventional wisdom is that mortgagees are the
successful bidders in over 99% of foreclosure sales. A number of rea-
sons are usually stated for this overwhelming number. It is said that
outsiders are discouraged from bidding, because they have to put up
fresh cash to buy the property at foreclosure sale, while the mortgagee
does not need to put up any cash, since it merely has to deduct the
amount of its bid from any mortgage balance already owing it. Fur-
ther, real estate is not generally bought at an auction sale. Parties
buying realty like to have time to examine the property, inquire about
possible financing, and negotiate the price. In addition, foreclosure
sales are not advertised in the same way that realty offerings are ordi-
narily advertised, so that buyers possibly interested do not even know
that it is available. Lastly, in some states buyers at foreclosures are
not entitled to a marketable title, and therefore a title search is neces-
sary before a person is in a position to bid at the sale. It is indisputable
that these arguments are correct, and there is little doubt that typi-
cally a very large proportion of the foreclosure sales end up with the
mortgagee as the only bidder. Nevertheless, the Wechsler study indi-
3. Bauer, Statutory Redemption Reconsidered:- The Operation of Iowa's Redemption
Statute in Two Counties Between 1881 and 1980, 70 IOWA L. REV. 343 (1985);
Bridewell, The Effects of Defective Mortgage Laws on Home Financing, 5 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 545 (1938); Carey & Brabner-Smith with Lansden & Sullivan,
Studies in Foreclosures in Cook County (pts. 1-4), 27 ILL. L. REV. 475, 595, 717, 849
(1933); Skilton, Government and the Mortgage Debtor 1940-1946, 95 U. PA. L. REV.
119 (1946).
4. Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto Strict Fore-
closure-An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 850 (1985).
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cates that at least in certain localities, there is a substantial third-party
market in foreclosed properties.
A second finding of the study was that when mortgagees bought in,
upon their resale of the property on the open market, they made prof-
its in about half of the cases and sustained losses in the other half.
Overall, the dollar amount of the losses exceeded the gains. From the
standpoint of this commentary, this finding is not terribly important.
The fact that, overall, mortgagees are losing money on their defaulted
mortgages hardly justifies their being unjustly enriched in some indi-
vidual cases at the expense of particular defaulting customers. This
point is emphasized by the fact that in those cases where mortgagees
held the properties for a short time after foreclosure and made a
profit, the profits as an annualized percentage of investment ranged
from 56% to over 1000%. Parenthetically, it should also be noted that
when third parties bought in at foreclosure and resold rather than
keeping the property for their own use, they made a profit in 14 out of
15 cases. The implication was that third parties purchased only the
most attractive and saleable properties.
In spite of the fact that third parties seemed to do better than
mortgagees when they resold, the study nevertheless found that more
than half of the foreclosure sales to third parties produced a surplus
over the amount of the debt. This should be contrasted with cases
where the mortgagee bid in, where only one produced a surplus for
the account of the mortgagor. At the same time over 90% of the sales
to mortgagees were for less than the amount of the debt, while this
was the case in only 39% of the sales to third parties. It is perfectly
apparent that when third party bidders appear, sales yield a much
higher percentage of market value than when the mortgagee is the
only bidder, and everyone (except for perhaps a windfall-seeking
mortgagee) seems to benefit thereby.
The last finding of importance was that, though there were defi-
ciencies in 94 of the 118 cases, mortgagees actually obtained a defi-
ciency judgment in only one of them. This is in accord with other
current reports on the subject.5 In many of the cases, a nominal bid
was made by a mortgagee who had no intention of seeking a deficiency
judgment, so that the relatively low percentage of the bid amount as
compared to market value was not very important, except in those
cases where the market value greatly exceeded the amount of the
debt.
As has oft been noted,6 various devices, both court invented and
5. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 7, 1985, at 19, col. 1. The article indicates that except in
cases of perceived mortgagor misconduct, most lenders are not seeking deficiency
judgments against necessitous borrowers.
6. See, e.g., G. NELSON & D. WHTMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 7.16, 7.21,
7.22, 8.1-8.8 (2d ed. 1985).
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statutory, have been tried over the years to solve the problem of the
inadequate bid at foreclosure sales and the resulting additional burden
of the deficiency judgment. I will summarize them very briefly.
Courts in most states reserve to themselves the power to refuse to con-
firm a judicial sale, if the bid is "so grossly inadequate as to shock the
judicial conscience." This rule has proved to be a weak reed, indeed,
because in practice courts have approved bids as low as one-third of
fair market value.
In a few jurisdictions, in response to the horrendous effects on the
economy during the Great Depression wrought by abnormally large
numbers of foreclosures that yielded very low sale prices, courts have
fashioned rules more protective of debtors. Such courts might (1) re-
fuse to confirm the sale if the price was "substantially inadequate," or
(2) fix an upset price-a price below which they would not confirm, or
(3) require a credit against the debt of a judicially determined figure
for fair market value. Most states have not adopted these rules as a
part of their common law, and it is doubtful that even where so
adopted the rules have, as a practical matter, resulted in the debtor's
getting the maximum feasible return on his property. The reason is
that debtors in most foreclosure proceedings do not have the money to
properly defend a foreclosure action, which therefore tends to go by
default. In such a situation, it is very difficult for the judge, on his
own motion, to assure that the price yielded at sale is a fair one. To
have a device that works, then, the mortgagee must have a built-in
incentive to maximize the debtor's return; or else, with no one on the
other side of the lawsuit, the mortgagee will seek to maximize only his
return.
Some states have responded to the two problems of inadequate
foreclosure sale prices and oppressive deficiency judgments by passing
various kinds of legislation. The statutory right of redemption was a
response to the problem of inadequate sale prices. Under it, the mort-
gagor and junior lienors are given the right to redeem after foreclo-
sure. The statutory right of redemption should be contrasted with the
equitable right of redemption which was a creature of the courts. In
equitable redemption the person redeeming must pay the balance of
the loan plus interest and costs before the foreclosure process is com-
pleted or be barred thenceforward from ever doing so. Under the stat-
utory right of redemption the person redeeming must pay the amount
of the foreclosure sale price, rather than the loan balance, within a
certain period of time after foreclosure or be forever barred thereafter
from doing so. The purpose of statutory redemption, which exists in a
little more than half the states, is to give the person bidding in at fore-
closure a strong incentive to bid a fair price. His penalty for getting
the property at an unfairly low price is the likelihood that the mortga-
gor or lienor will statutorily redeem at that price. A strong criticism
[Vol. 66:373
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of statutory redemption is that it has not had the intended effect. The
reason is that third parties are discouraged from bidding at foreclosure
at all for fear that there will be a redemption a year or more after the
sale. Another strong deterrent to bidding by third parties is the fact
that under the law of most states having statutory redemption, the
successful bidder does not get possession of the property he has
purchased until after the period for statutory redemption has run.
This could entail a delay of up to two years, thus preventing the
buyer's use of his own property while substantial deterioration of it
might occur.
Professor Bauer in a recent empirical study of the operation of
Iowa's statutory redemption law in two counties has concluded that it
does work to a degree to mitigate the problem of price inadequacy.7
He inferred this from the fact that over a period of 100 years, redemp-
tions took place in the counties studied in a little more than 10% of the
cases. However, Bauer did not study what happened to the 90% of the
cases where redemption did not take place and therefore was unable
to tell how many of the nonredemptions were accounted for by the
fact that the foreclosure sale prices were adequate and how many by
the fact that prospective redeemers had insufficient funds. In my view
it is not important whether statutory redemption is counterproduc-
tive, as its critics say, or useful, as its advocates say, if we can devise a
system of selling land in foreclosure that will approach the results of a
competitive free market.
The second problem sought to be mitigated by state legislation was
the abusive deficiency judgment. Such can occur, of course, when a
foreclosure sale price, though well below what the property can bring
in the open market, is used to determine what should be credited
against the mortgage debt owed by the mortgagor. Various solutions
were enacted in many of the states. In some the use of foreclosure
sale price as the appropriate credit against the debt was completely
abandoned, and in its place was substituted a credit of the fair market
value of the property. A few states applied this rule only to cases
where the mortgagee himself bought in at foreclosure. It is questiona-
ble how effective the fair market value credit is, because, as men-
tioned earlier, most mortgage foreclosures are not defended and end
up in a decree for plaintiff by default. It becomes quite difficult then
for the court to get a fair approximation of the appropriate amount to
credit on the debt.
Another approach to the problem of unfair deficiency judgments is
to prohibit deficiency judgments outright at least under certain cir-
cumstances. For example, in a few states the statutes prohibit defi-
ciency judgments where foreclosure is by exercise of a non-judicial
7. Bauer, supra note 3, at 383-89.
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power of sale.8 In others there is a prohibition where the mortgage
being foreclosed is of the purchase money variety. The Uniform Land
Transactions Act prohibits deficiency judgments on purchase money
mortgages given by residential owner-occupants. 9 Again a more effec-
tive way of solving the difficulty of the abusive deficiency judgment is
to make sure that the foreclosure procedure results in the highest pos-
sible price for all parties concerned.
A Proposal
In order to bring the highest possible price-the price that every-
one except the most rapacious of lenders would favor-state laws
should mandate that property in foreclosure be marketed in the same
way that rational owners, not involved in a forced sale situation, sell
their property. Different kinds of property are marketed in different
ways. For example, one might market a foreclosed single family
dwelling by first attempting to sell it through newspaper advertising
in the real estate section, and then, if unsuccessful, list it with a local
real estate broker who deals in that kind of property. On the other
hand, if the property involved is a shopping center, one might first
directly contact established firms that are in the business of buying
such distressed property and then resort to nationally connected bro-
kers who specialize in dealing with shopping centers.
Sometimes unusual approaches to marketing property may be ap-
propriate because of atypical location or special economic conditions.
For example, as this is written, new residential condominiums in some
parts of the Sunbelt are in oversupply and are being marketed by well
advertised and attended auctions. In normal times the best way to sell
such properties is to market them through resident sales agents or
real estate brokers, but currently the traditional methods simply have
not been working in certain localities. Unusual market conditions can
call for the use of unconventional methods. The proper approach for
the law should always be to require that the property be marketed in
the way knowledgeable sellers of that kind of property, in that vicinity
and at that time, are doing it.
The Uniform Land Transactions Act (not enacted in any state) pro-
vides for a similar approach,10 which seems to me, however, to be
flawed. It says in section 3-508(a) that "Sale may be at a public sale or
by private negotiation, by one or more contracts, as a unit or in par-
cels, at any time and place, and on any terms including sale on credit,
but every aspect of the sale, including the method, advertising, time,
8. A non-judicial power of sale involves the use of some sort of public sale without
the necessity for permission or supervision of a court of law.
9. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3-510(b), 13 U.L.A. 618 (1977).
10. Id. at §§ 3-508(a), 3-509(d).
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place, and terms, must be reasonable."'" The Act does not require
that the sale be conducted by a disinterested third party, but rather
allows the mortgage creditor to conduct the sale itself and if it wishes
to, to buy the property for its own account. The difficulty that I see in
the Act is that the mortgagee is given great economic incentive not to
sell the property for the best price, so that it can buy in and make a
profit on resale. Indeed, if the property is sold in foreclosure directly
to a third party at a fair price, the mortgagor and not the mortgagee
will get the full benefit of the excess of the selling price over the
amount of the debt. With that kind of system, there is every danger
that mortgage companies will try to evade the legal requirements of
selling in the regular market.
An alternative suggested by Professors Nelson and Whitman12 is to
have the sale conducted by an independent public official who, in addi-
tion to a small flat fee, would be given the incentive to maximize the
price by giving him personally a commission based on a percentage
ranging from 1% to 13/4% of any portion of the price that exceeds the
amount of the debt. A few very serious criticisms of this approach
should be made. First, the addition of a new bureaucracy to solve the
problem of selling real property in foreclosure is hardly inviting.
There is no reason to think that public officials as a group are better
than private parties at doing things which the private economy has
handled very well for hundreds of years. Second, such a small com-
mission would not provide very much incentive to maximize the price.
In such a situation, it would not matter a great deal to the administra-
tor whether he got 1% of $100,000 or of $125,000. But if one increased
the amount of the commission to solve that, then it would merely ex-
acerbate the complications of the third problem, that of possible cor-
ruption. The appointment of a public official, who can personally
make a great deal of money through the sale of foreclosed property,
opens the potential for serious corruption in the process of deciding
who will get that exceedingly remunerative sinecure. Surely, then,
there is a better way than the appointment of a public official to han-
dle the problem of maximizing the returns in foreclosure.
My suggestion is a simple one, which would require the changing of
only a few rules. First, forbid the mortgagee from buying in at foreclo-
sure as the English do. This would prevent the mortgagee from ar-
ranging to buy the property at a "public" sale at which he was the only
bidder and then later selling the property for what it was really worth
for his own account. Second, to bring in the highest possible price for
the benefit of all concerned, have the mortgagee, as agent for all the
parties in interest sell the property in the manner above described,
that is, in the way that such assets, not in foreclosure, are ordinarily
11. Id at § 3-508(a).
12. G. NELSON & D. WHImAN, supra note 6, at § 8.8.
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marketed. If after such a sale, a deficiency remained, then as under
prior law, those personally liable on the original debt would be liable
for that unpaid balance. Third, the traditional rule regarding the dis-
tribution of foreclosure proceeds requires that liens be paid off in or-
der of priority, with the balance, if any, then going to the mortgagor.
Obviously, if that rule were not changed, the mortgagee would have
absolutely no incentive to maximize the amount of the selling price
above the amount of its own lien. The incentive needed to prod the
mortgagee to do its best would necessarily consist of a substantial sum
of money. My suggestion would be that the mortgagee get a percent-
age of the excess left after all liens and charges are paid. That per-
centage should range downward from perhaps 40% of amounts up to
$25,000, to 25% of amounts over $100,000. For very large amounts,
even a smaller percentage might be appropriate.13 One might make
the criticism that such a system would give mortgagees a beneficial
interest in the property of the mortgagor, something which the law
has never before done. That is true but only in theory. Under the
present system the mortgagee can get the entire equity in the property
by merely bidding in at foreclosure at a fictitiously low price, and then
later taking for itself the entire proceeds of the real sale at market
value. Surely that is an infinitely worse situation than under the plan
proposed here with the mortgagee getting only a limited portion of the
equity.
To see how the system would work, let us examine the fact pattern
that began this commentary. When E Co. forecloses the $40,000 mort-
gage on the property worth $60,000, it will take control of the property
after default and its acceleration of the debt. Then it would take care
of the sale of the property just as any owner who wanted to sell would
do. If the property were not immediately saleable, it would rent it out,
if that were the reasonable way to handle the problem. Just as under
present law, E Co. would be liable to account for its unreasonable fail-
ure to maximize the income available from property under its control.
The mortgagee would have a maximum reasonable period of time
(perhaps two years) to dispose of the property. After that, sale would
occur through a well-advertised auction at which the mortgagee could
not bid in. In this case, if E Co. promptly sold the property through
normal channels for its $60,000 market value, less $5,000 in brokerage
13. Compare my suggestion with that of the author in Wechsler, supra note 4, at 884-
90. There the author suggests a system to maximize recovery where there has
been a resale by the mortgagee who bought in, suggesting that the entire surplus
be returned to the mortgagor, if but only if it is residential property and the mort-
gagee resells within one year. I cannot imagine why a mortgagee would not seek
to avoid this result by waiting for more than a year. Nor is it clear to me why if
the mortgagee sells within the year, it would have any incentive to sell at full
value in view of its obligation to return to the mortgagor any excess over debt
produced by the sale.
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and other expenses, the resulting proceeds of $55,000 would be distrib-
uted as follows:
To the mortgagee, (A) $40,000 for the principal amount of the debt,
plus costs and accrued interest, less the amount of the rents for the
property collected by it, plus (B) 40% of the difference between
$55,000 and (A);
To the mortgagor, 60% of the difference between $55,000 and (A).
In this case, assuming there were no accrued interest, costs or
rents, this would mean the mortgagee would get its $40,000, plus 40%
of the difference between $55,000, the amount yielded at sale, and the
$40,000, for a total of $46,000. Mortgagor would get the balance of
$9,000. There obviously would be no deficiency judgment. Thus, the
matter would end with mortgagor giving up, after expenses, assets
worth $51,00014 to pay off a $40,000 loan. This should be compared
with the unfair result possible under present law, where the mortga-
gee recovered $64,000 on a $40,000 debt and the mortgagor was liable
for a $9,000 deficiency judgment and ended up paying and giving up
assets worth a total of $69,000.15 There is an $18,000 improvement in
favor of the mortgagor in the proposed law. It is accounted for by the
fact that mortgagor is not liable for a $9,000 deficiency judgment and is
in addition getting a refund of $9,000.
Obviously one could criticize this proposal by saying that the above
numbers are merely made up and that the proposed system would not
work as beautifully in the real world as in the hypothetical world here
constructed. It is true that I have painted the present law in the grim-
mest way, in that I have hypothesized a situation where the mortgagee
went for a deficiency judgment, whereas it seems to be true that mort-
gagees often do not do so as a matter of course.16 However, I must say
in reply that in my own experience, mortgagees do still occasionally
seek deficiency judgments in the same kind of unfair circumstances
depicted here. The numbers represented in this hypothetical are, un-
fortunately, not atypical ones at all. There are, indeed, too many
abuses in this area of the law. The reforms that I have suggested
14. This consists of the $60,000 market value less the $9,000 refund by mortgagee
from the excess yielded by the sale.
15. The result is perhaps clearer in the following chart:
Present Law Proposed Law
Mortgagee receives in foreclosure $64,000 $46,000
Mortgagor gives up this amount to pay off the $69,000 $51,000
$40,000 obligation
16. Of course, I am not suggesting that mortgagees fail to seek deficiency judgments
for altruistic reasons. Rather, it seems that pursuit of mortgagors for the last
dollar typically does not yield enough to cover the costs of doing so. In addition,
many lenders believe they would invite a serious public relations problem if they
aggressively sought to recover and collect such judgments as a matter of course.
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would go a long way to right the presently existing unfair balance be-
tween mortgagor and mortgagee in foreclosure cases.
